It
was July 2000—the Camp David Summit. In the news footage, we saw
President Clinton standing at the doorway, grinning broadly, his arms
spread out in a welcoming gesture as he graciously invites his two esteemed
guests to enter the room. But instead of entering, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak and Palestinian Chairman Yasir Arafat cavort humorously before
the cameras. No, you go first, gestures one. No, I insist, YOU go first
gestures the other. Both are smiling jovially and obviously enjoying
each other’s company.
Or so it
appeared.
In fact,
however, that public display was a far cry from what went on in private.
Away from the reporters and cameras, discourse between Barak and Arafat
at the Camp David Summit was discourteous, emotionally charged, and
stressful. According to Gilead Sher, one of Israel’s chief negotiators,
Barak steadfastly avoided Arafat and refused to recognize him when their
paths crossed.
When Barak
first entered the dining hall, for example, Arafat approached him and
extended his hand. But instead of shaking the hand of the Palestinian
leader, Barak stood in place, his hand at his side. The two men sat
on either side of Secretary of State Madeline Albright and did not speak
once during the entire evening.
Barak’s
cold and distant attitude dominated the fifteen grueling days of the
summit, even though several members of both the Israeli and the American
delegations urged him to warm up to Arafat and deal with him directly
and personally. Senior Israeli negotiator, Shlomo Ben-Ami, told Barak
that honor was very important to the Palestinian leader and Barak’s
behavior was making Arafat feel Barak disrespected him.
Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright suggested Barak spend some informal time
with Arafat, but Barak told her that eating baklava together would not
change things.
Barak’s
behavior was a direct contrast to the negotiation rules of an earlier
Israeli Prime Minister. “Don’t ridicule your opponent, especially
not in public,” says Shimon Peres. “Don’t challenge
him in the face of his subordinates. When he is with his subordinates,
give him respect.” You should confront issues honestly, Peres
says, but “in a meeting before only four eyes.”
In Israel,
two weeks after the Camp David Summit, Yossi Beilin, one of the Israeli
architects of the 1993 Oslo Accord, met with two Palestinian negotiators
who had also been at the Summit. They told him Barak’s behavior
demonstrated he placed little value on personal relationships.
Barak,
a former Israeli military chief of staff and a man known for his sharp
intellect and self-reliance, is the most decorated soldier in Israel’s
history and a confident debater. But, as he proved at Camp David, he
is an extremely inexperienced diplomatic negotiator. For as any Master
Negotiator will tell you: Building a relationship with those on the
other side is crucial to the success of a negotiation.
The Relationship
Investment
Barak is
a tragic symbol of just how important relationship-building is in negotiation.
Palestinian chief negotiator Sa’eb Erakat describes him as “a
character from a chapter of a Greek tragedy,” because the Israeli
Prime Minister was more willing to negotiate with the Palestinians than
any other Israeli head of state and more willing to make concessions
for the cause of peace. As far as Barak was concerned it was the substance
of the negotiation that was the key, and he had developed a sweeping
grand strategy designed to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
only to be stymied by the slow pace of negotiations and what he viewed
as Arafat’s inflexibility on the issues.
He could
not understand that talking to Arafat and interacting with the man personally
was every bit as important to success as the concessions he was willing
to make.
Personal
interaction is especially important when “the other side”
is an Arab leader for whom socializing, respect, honor, and flattery
are considered essential foreplay. Former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt,
Herman Eilts says the hours he spent in informal conversation with his
counterparts helped him cultivate new contacts and acquire invaluable
information. This personal approach to Egyptian leaders was the hallmark
of the Kissinger period of Middle East diplomacy, and was carried on
by President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State George Schultz, President
George H.W. Bush, and President Bill Clinton.
In any
negotiation, issues divide, but common human traits tend to unite. The
relationships between the parties are the “sine qua non,”
former Middle East Coordinator, Ambassador Dennis Ross says. “[Relationships
are] more important than anything else. People will reveal things to
you because of the relationship you have with them.” He adds that
people on the other side will help you to negotiate by pointing out
that certain calculations that you have made for tradeoffs are, in fact,
not the right calculations.
Find Common
Ground—No Matter How Insignificant
During
the 1991 Madrid Conference between Israel and the Arab countries, the
Arab negotiators didn’t want direct contact with their Israeli
counterparts, refusing even to go into a conference room and negotiate
with the Israeli delegates face-to-face.
During
breaks, however, coffee was served in a common area. “One day,”
former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Zalman Shoval remembers,
“The coffee cart came around and I said to one of the Jordanian
delegates, ‘Is this not a terrible coffee?’ And he answered,
‘I agree. It is a terrible coffee.’”
That seemingly
minor breakthrough was a moment that would be hailed later as “The
Coffee Diplomacy,” because once the ice was broken, Ambassador
Shoval and his Jordanian counterpart began talking about other things
as well, as did their colleagues, and eventually the Arabs and the Israelis
did sit down together in the same conference room.
The bad
coffee commiseration certainly did not restore decades of deeply rooted
distrust on both sides. But the discovery of that minuscule mutual similarity—a
higher coffee standard—was an important tiny step on the long
march toward peace, marking the beginning of a personal relationship
between an Israeli and a Jordanian. Three years later their two countries
signed a peace accord.
Finding
the personal characteristics you share with your negotiating counterpart
and playing to them might very well help overcome even the most deeply
entrenched political, financial, or ideological differences.
Former
Secretary of State James Baker has seen the development of a relationship
between negotiators bring even the most contentious issues to a successful
resolution. He thinks that’s because friendships enable negotiators
to abandon their official positions and reveal the thoughts and assumptions
underlying those positions. That, in turn, is likely to lead to a resolution
that can benefit both sides. Conversely, Baker says, if a relationship
sours, even sides that are not that far apart may have trouble reaching
an agreement.
Relationship-building
is less prevalent in American culture than it is in other cultures.
Experienced American negotiators, however, overcome the cultural bias.
Chicago Tribune President and Publisher Scott Smith has played a central
role in negotiating the company’s key acquisitions. “If
I am the lead negotiator,” he says, “I want to be clear
on who the real players on the other side are. Then I invest time in
getting to know them and understanding their styles for the purpose
of building relationships with them . . . to make the negotiations more
productive.”
If you
become close to the other side, will it hinder your ability to negotiate
assertively? Will it make you “softer” and thus more likely
to compromise your objectives by conceding on substantive matters?
Experienced
negotiators answer “no.” Relationships enhance bargaining
transparency by enabling you to better understand where the other side
is coming from, what they really want, what they may be willing to settle
for, and where there may be a comfortable middle ground, but they should
not interfere with the negotiating objectives. Take the relationship
between Jimmy Carter and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, for example.
Carter writes in his memoirs that the two men developed a natural friendship
the first time they met, sharing information about each other’s
families and childhood experiences and ambitions.
Later,
in the Camp David summit, the disagreements that surfaced did not affect
the personal relationship that had developed between the two leaders.
At the same time, however, the disagreements were not cast aside because
the two men had become friends. Observers said Carter had less trouble
separating business from friendship than Anwar Sadat did and that he
pushed hard to secure an accord.
Motivations
for Relationship-Building
Relationships
between negotiators are not ends in themselves. They are primarily instruments
that help facilitate the negotiation process and its outcome. Relationships
also yield important long-term emotional and social benefits. Many well-known
negotiators who interact often find that the personal relationships
they have developed over time are a source of mutual enjoyment, provide
a means of relaxing from the pressure of intense sessions, and, more
often than not, drive them to find mutually beneficial solutions.
However,
building a relationship is hard work. It requires good will, major investments
in time and energy, and a conviction that the results will add value
to the negotiation process. In deciding whether or not to invest in
relationship building, skilled negotiators evaluate the potential benefits
a relationship might yield, including the following possible benefits.
Enhanced Transparency and Flexibility
Former
Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze built a very close relationship over the years. They visited
each other’s homes, met each other’s families and spent
recreational time together. Schultz even took Shevardnadze and his entourage
out yachting on the Potomac River.
Shevardnadze
cherished the years he spent negotiating with Schultz. He recalled that
the friendship did not keep the two from holding firm to their official
positions. What the relationship did, he said, was create trust and
understanding so that when one of them said he could not go any further,
the other took him at his word.
Negotiators
who have built good relationships with each other tend to be more flexible.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 compelled
Israel to return occupied territories to the Arabs in exchange for peace.
When the British Ambassador to the U.N., Lord Caradon drafted this resolution,
the Soviet representative asked him to postpone the vote by two days.
Lord Caradon refused. When the Soviet representative explained that
the request was not coming from his government but rather from him personally,
Lord Caradon changed his mind and granted the request immediately.
Based on
the trusting relationship the two had developed, Lord Caradon was completely
confident that there was a good reason for the request and that the
Soviet representative’s intentions were honorable. Indeed, two
days later the Soviets voted for resolution 242.
Interdependence
Negotiating
tends to be an interdependent affair. What brings each side to the bargaining
table is the fact that it needs something from the other side.
This is
especially true in labor-management relations. Management may like or
dislike its union and vise versa, but the two are interdependent. Once
they recognize that fact, they tend to build relationships that enable
them to work better together. Morton Bahr the President of the Communication
Workers of America, says that when he and Edward Whitacre, the chairman
and CEO of SBC Communications, Inc., realized it was in each of their
best interests to work together rather than against each other, relationship-building
became a top priority. A little bit nervous about the possible outcome,
Bahr nonetheless invited Whitacre to address a union convention. Bahr
was then invited to address the company shareholders.
Accepting
each other’s legitimacy made the contract negotiations in 2001
“actually fun,” Bahr says. “The contract was not due
to expire until April 2001, but already in November 2000, Mr. Whitacre
called me and said: ‘Why don’t we just negotiate the contract
early and get in and out? I already know,’ he told me, ‘what
is going on in the rest of the telecommunications industry.’ So
we met and by January 2001 we had it all done.”
“Even
before that [negotiation],” Bahr says, “two or three years
ago, Whitacre had a management meeting of 3500 managers of SBC in San
Antonio, Texas. And he called me and said: ‘Come down. I want
everybody to hear the same message.’ In his opening address he
introduced me and told them about the partnership between SBC and the
union. It was extraordinary. Many (managers) came to speak with me.
If the chairman is committed to the partnership—and you can tell
if it is phony or real—then others will follow his lead.”
